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We estimate the effect of employer offers of retiree health benefits (RHBs) on the timing of 
retirement using a sample of Health and Retirement Study (HRS) men observed over a period of 
up to 12 years. We hypothesize that the effect of RHBs differs for workers of different ages—a 
hypothesis we can test now that the main HRS cohort has aged sufficiently. We apply three well-
known panel data estimators and find that, for men in their 50s, RHBs have little or no effect on 
retirement decisions; however, a substantial effect emerges for men in their early 60s. We use 
simulations to illustrate how RHBs alter retirement patterns. 
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In 2009, 28 percent of large private employers offered health insurance coverage to their 
early retirees—former employees under age 65 who were not yet eligible for Medicare—down 
from 48 percent in 1993 (Fronstin 2010). Health insurance for early retirees represents a 
substantial benefit to workers and a potential incentive to retire early: Workers with such retiree 
health benefits (RHBs) can retire before age 65 and retain their former employment-related 
health insurance at relatively low cost, whereas workers without RHBs who retire before age 65 
face costly options if they want health insurance coverage—they must either pay for the former 
employer’s health benefits at cost or purchase private health insurance. 
How do RHBs influence retirement patterns? In particular, does the influence of RHBs 
differ for workers at different ages? These questions are important because, if RHBs influence 
the retirement decisions only of eligible workers who are nearing age 65, their implications for 
labor supply and employer costs would be quite different than if they affected the retirement of 
all eligible workers equally, as is often assumed. Also, the effect of RHBs on retirement has 
implications for the labor supply effects of health care reforms—such as universal single-payer 
insurance—that would break or weaken the link between health insurance and employment that 
now exists in the United States (Blau and Gilleskie 2001). For example, we would make quite 
different predictions about the implications of health care reform for the exit of older workers 
from the labor force depending on whether RHBs encourage retirement of all eligible workers 
equally, or only of workers in their early 60s. 
Our goal in this paper is to add to the existing evidence on the effects of RHBs on 
retirement along two lines. First, because it is important to know whether the influence of RHBs 
on retirement decisions is heterogeneous across workers of different ages and whether the 
 2 
influence of RHBs changes over the business cycle, we estimate a model that allows the effect of 
RHBs to vary for different subgroups of workers and over time. We do this using 12 years of 
data (1992–2004) on older men from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a major 
longitudinal survey sponsored by the National Institute of Aging and conducted at the University 
of Michigan (Institute for Social Research 2009). Second, because workers with RHB offers may 
have unobserved characteristics that lead to earlier retirement, we apply a fixed effects estimator 
to the RHS panel (in addition to pooled OLS and random effects) in an attempt to better identify 
the effect of RHBs on retirement. 
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. After a brief review of the existing literature 
on RHB coverage and retirement (section II), we describe our approach to estimation (section 
III). The basic model we specify is similar to other reduced-form models in the literature, but in 
addition to a restricted model with a single average treatment effect, we specify a less restrictive 
model in which the effect of RHBs varies across different groups of workers and over time. We 
also describe our rationale for applying a fixed effects estimator, in addition to pooled OLS and 
random effects estimators. Section IV describes the HRS data we use and gives details of the 
variables we use to specify the models. 
We then describe the empirical findings from the restricted model in which the estimated 
effect of RHBs is averaged over all eligible workers (section V). The pooled OLS and random 
effects estimates are similar to previous findings in the literature and suggest that a worker with 
an RHB offer is about 3 percentage points (11 percent) more likely to retire than a worker 
without. But the fixed effects estimates suggest that the effect of RHBs on retirement is about 
half as large (and statistically insignificant). The attenuated RHB effect under the fixed effects 
estimator has three possible explanations—first, the pooled OLS and random effects estimators 
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suffer from heterogeneity bias (that is, workers with RHB offers would have retired earlier even 
without those offers); second, the fixed effects estimates are plagued with measurement error and 
the associated attenuation bias; and third, the restricted model is misspecified (for example, the 
effect of RHBs on retirement should be allowed to vary across age groups). In the Appendix, we 
follow up on the concern with measurement error by implementing sample-restriction tests and 
bounding techniques. These tests cannot dispose of the concern that measurement error is 
responsible for part of the attenuation in the RHB effect estimated by fixed effects, but they do 
suggest that the attenuation is caused mainly by functional form misspecification and/or failure 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Section VI presents empirical findings from the unrestricted model, in which RHB effects 
are disaggregated for subgroups of workers and over time. We begin by performing statistical 
tests that reject the restricted model (in which the RHB effect of retirement is the same for 
workers at all ages) in favor of the unrestricted model (in which the retirement effect varies with 
age). We then describe the estimates, which strongly suggest that RHBs do not affect the 
retirement behavior of workers aged 50–56, have at most a modest effect on workers aged 57–
59, and have a quite substantial effect on workers aged 60–64. This pattern holds with all three 
estimators (pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects), and suggests that the choice of 
estimator is less important than freeing up the functional form of the model so that RHB effects 
are allowed to differ for different groups of workers. 
Section VII presents simulated survivor functions based on the empirical findings. These 
survivor functions show that the retirement patterns (and by implication the RHB costs) implied 
by a model with disaggregated effects differ sharply from those implied by a restricted model. In 
particular, survivor functions based on estimates of the unrestricted model (and random effects 
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and fixed effects estimators) suggest that RHBs increase a cohort’s cumulative person-years of 
retirement by 6 to 11 percent by the time cohort reaches age 65. In contrast, survivor functions 
based on the restricted model and estimators comparable to those used in earlier work (pooled 
OLS and random effects) suggest that RHBs increase a cohort’s cumulative person-years of 
retirement by 37 to 57 percent. The implication is that the effect of RHBs on retirement behavior 
is probably more modest than previous work has suggested. 
 
II. Previous Research 
Early estimates of the effect of health insurance coverage on retirement used data from 
the Retirement History Survey, conducted mainly during the 1970s (Gustman and Steinmeier 
1994, Rust and Phelan 1997), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (Karoly and 
Rogowski 1994, Madrian 1994), the Current Population Survey (Gruber and Madrian 1995), and 
the National Medical Expenditure Survey (Madrian 1994). With the notable exception of 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1994), these studies concluded that RHB availability (or continuation 
coverage in the case of Gruber and Madrian) significantly increases the probability that an older 
worker will retire. 
Hurd and McGarry (1993), Rogowski and Karoly (2000), Blau and Gilleskie (2001), 
Strumpf (2007), and Congdon-Hohman (2008) all estimate the effects of RHBs on retirement (or 
retirement expectations in the case of Hurd and McGarry) using HRS data. Hurd and McGarry 
(1993) examine wave 1 (1992) of the HRS and find that workers eligible for RHBs partly or 
fully paid by the employer are significantly less likely than other workers to report that they 
expect to work past age 62. Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001) each 
take advantage of two waves of the HRS and find that workers with an offer of RHBs are 
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significantly more likely to retire than workers without. In particular, Rogowski and Karoly 
(2000) find that workers with RHBs in 1992 were about 11 percentage points more likely to be 
retired in 1996 than those without. Blau and Gilleskie (2001) emphasize the importance of cost-
sharing on the estimated effect of RHBs on retirement. They examine retirement transitions 
during 1992–1994 and find that RHBs increased the probability of retirement by 6 percentage 
points if the employer paid the full RHB premium, but only by 2 percentage points if retirees had 
to contribute to the RHB’s cost. Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2003) also highlight the 
importance of RHB premium costs to the retirement decision, and Congdon-Hohman (2008) 
focuses on the health insurance of wives as a factor in husbands’ retirement decisions. 
At least two studies of RHBs have obtained estimates of the effect of RHBs on retirement 
mainly as a byproduct of more comprehensive structural analyses. Ambitious papers by Blau and 
Gilleskie (2008) and Strumpf (2007) are in this vein. Blau and Gilleskie (2008) estimate a 
dynamic structural model of retirement, using the first four waves (1992–1998, or three 
transitions) of the HRS, with the goal of evaluating reforms in health policy. Strumpf (2007) 
focuses on RHBs’ effects on health and health care costs; her estimates of the effect of RHBs on 
retirement are similar to those of Rogowski and Karoly (2000). 
Concerns about the endogeneity of RHBs are a frequent refrain in this literature—see 
especially Blau and Gilleskie (2008). As McGarry (2004) points out, a fixed effects estimator 
would be a natural way to handle unobserved heterogeneity in retirement decisions because it 
takes advantage of within-individual variation to identify the effects on retirement of factors like 
RHBs, pensions, housing wealth, and non-housing wealth. However, mainly because only two or 
three waves of the HRS data were available when the work was performed, existing research has 
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not applied a fixed effects estimator to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. In the next section, 
we outline an approach that allows us to apply a fixed effects estimator to the HRS data. 
The literature examining the effect of RHBs on retirement is a small fraction of the 
economic literature on the determinants of retirement. We return to additional aspects of this 
literature below when we describe the approach to estimation. 
 
III. Approach to Estimation 
Clearly, a key issue vexing past research on RHBs and retirement behavior is whether 
RHB-eligibility is correlated with unobserved individual characteristics associated with early 
retirement. It is plausible that workers with a taste for early retirement would sort into jobs 
offering health benefits to early retirees. Indeed, workers generally need to make such a selection 
with some foresight because employers base RHB eligibility on age and service requirements. 
For example, in 2009, 37 percent of large private employers required workers to be at least age 
55 and have at least 10 years of service to be eligible for RHBs, and most required at least 10 
years of service for eligibility (Fronstin 2010). Estimators that do not take account of this 
unobserved heterogeneity would not identify the effect of RHBs on the probability of retirement 
and would be upward-biased. 
Well-known panel data methods offer a possible way to address the problem of 
unobserved effects, although as we will see, these methods are by no means a panacea. The HRS 
data we examine have information on six discrete two-year time intervals (seven interviews, each 
separated by about two years) starting in 1992, so we model the probability of worker i being 
retired at time t+1 as a function of observables and unobservables at time t: 
P(retiredi,t+1 = 1 | •) = xitβ  + ηt + ci       (1) 
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where xit is a vector of person-specific characteristics capturing the observed heterogeneity in the 
sample (these may be either time-varying or constant over time), ηt denotes transition-specific 
fixed effects (to account for economic and labor market conditions), and ci denotes unobserved 
worker-specific effects. We specify xitβ  as follows: 
xitβ = β1(rhbit) + β2(pensionit) + β3(wealthit) + β4(ageit) + β5(demogit) + β6(healthit) + 
β7(spouseit) + β8(jobcharit)        (2) 
where rhbit denotes a set of indicators modeling whether worker i had employer-provided health 
insurance (EPHI) and an RHB offer in year t, pensionit and wealthit are sets of indicators of the 
pension and nonpension wealth of worker i in year t, ageit is a set of age indicators, demogit 
denotes variables indicating race and level of education, healthit is a set of health indicators, 
spouseit is a set of dummies indicating whether worker i was married in year t and whether his 
spouse was working, and jobcharit is a set of job characteristic indicators. The rationale for 
including these variables in models of retirement behavior is well established in the literature—
see for example Ruhm (1990a) and Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990)—although different 
retirement models specify these variables in different ways. In particular, the specification of 
pension wealth in models of retirement has been an active field of research during the past 25 
years—see Coile and Gruber (2007), Friedberg and Webb (2005), and Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2001/2002) for insightful guides. We return to these points below. 
Equation (2) follows the existing literature in restricting the effect of an RHB offer on 
retirement to be the same for all workers—that is, β1 is a “main effect” or “average treatment 
effect” that does not vary over workers. This assumption is unduly strong, especially because we 
suspect the influence of RHB offers may differ for workers of different ages and over the 
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business cycle. For example, Coile and Levine (2007) find that labor market downturns increase 
the probability of retirement, particularly for workers eligible for Social Security. 
To allow the effect of RHBs to vary with individual characteristics and over time, we 
respecify equation (2) by fully interacting rhbit with all explanatory variables and ηt (the 
transition indicators): 
xitβ = β1(rhbit) + β2(pensionit)(rhbit) + β3(wealthit)(rhbit) + β4(ageit)(rhbit) + 
β5(demogit)(rhbit) + β6(healthit)(rhbit) + β7(spouseit)(rhbit) + β8(jobcharit)(rhbit) + 
ηt (rhbit)         (3) 
In equation (3), (ageit)(rhbit) denotes age indicators by themselves and age indicators fully 
interacted with the health insurance-RHB indicators (with β4 the vector of coefficients on these 
indicators), and similarly for the other terms in the equation. Retrieving estimated subgroup 
effects from this fully interacted model is straightforward if tedious: After substituting equation 
(3) into equation (1), we differentiate with respect to rhb and evaluate the derivative for a given 
subgroup at the sample mean (that is, substituting sample mean characteristics for variables other 
than those in the given subgroup).1 
Equation (1) is an unobserved-effects model for panel data, and we face a number of 
choices in estimating it. A computationally undemanding and easily interpreted approach is to 
estimate it as a linear probability model (LPM): 
retiredi,t+1 = xitβ  + ηt + ci + uit        (4) 
where retiredi,t+1 equals 1 if individual i is retired at interview t+1, conditional on being a full-
time worker in 1992 and not having retired before time t, and uit is an idiosyncratic error. A key 
objection to the LPM—predictions of the retirement probability outside the unit interval—does 
                                                
1 Each estimate is a linear combination of coefficient estimates and sample means, so implementation is 
straightforward using Stata’s “lincom” command, which produces both a point estimate and its standard error. 
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not apply in this case because we estimate a saturated model, so fitted retirement probabilities are 
cell frequencies and cannot fall outside the unit interval (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 509–510). The 
other main objection to the LPM—heteroskedasticity—can be handled by computing Huber-
White standard errors.  
In keeping with past efforts to estimate the effect of RHBs on retirement, we could (and 
do) estimate equation (4) by pooled OLS; however, this poses two problems. First, if the 
individual fixed effects ci are correlated with the observable characteristics xit, then estimates of 
β  (β1 in particular) will suffer from heterogeneity bias due to the omitted individual fixed effects. 
Second, pooled OLS combines the individual fixed effects ci and the idiosyncratic error uit into a 
single composite error, vit, which will be serially correlated. This latter issue can be resolved by 
imposing structure on vit and applying a random effects estimator, but random effects will still be 
biased for β  if the individual fixed effects ci are correlated with the observable characteristics xit.  
A possible solution to the first (more serious) problem of heterogeneity bias is to apply a 
fixed effects estimator to equation (4). This is feasible, at least in a linear model, because we 
have time-varying observations of rhbit and other independent variables for each worker. The 
fixed-effects estimator identifies the effect of RHBs on the timing of retirement from individual-
specific variation over time in RHB eligibility, which is less likely to be correlated with 
unobservables than is eligibility for RHBs at a point in time. However, a potential drawback of 
the fixed effects estimator, which we address below, is that it will be downward-biased if the 
regressors—in this case, deviations from individual means—are measured with error. 
It might seem natural to apply nonlinear fixed effects estimators, such as probit or logit, 
to equation (1), but as Wooldridge (2002, chapter 15), Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chapter 23), 
and Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) discuss, these are computationally difficult and, in the case 
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of probit, inconsistent.2 Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) have suggested nonlinear 
“correlated random effects” estimators for panel data that have many of the desirable features of 
fixed effects estimators. However, the set up of the sample we use differs from that envisioned 
by the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach (because predictors at time t influence a decision 
observed at time t+1), so the application is not straightforward. Accordingly, we rely on the 
linear fixed effects estimator.3 
 
IV. Data and Variable Specification 
We estimate equation (4) using a sample of men born between 1931 and 1941 from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).4 The analysis below is restricted to men who were working 
full-time (at least 35 hours per week) at the time of the first survey in 1992. Available HRS data 
allow us to follow these men through six transitions: 1992–1994, 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1998–
2000, 2000–2002, and 2002–2004.  
Figure 1 summarizes the behavior of the men in the main HRS sample over the 12 years 
we observe them. The sample starts in 1992 with 3,150 men aged 51–61 who were employed 
full-time. Between 1992 and 1994, 303 left the study due to attrition (death or other reason), so 
we consider 2,847 men to have been “at risk” of retirement during the 1994–1996 period. Of 
these, 225 (8 percent) had retired by 1994, and another 309 moved to part-time work, 
                                                
2 The computational difficulty in fixed effects probit and logit arises because the fixed effect for the latent 
propensity to retire—equation (1)—perfectly classifies anyone whose response does not vary over the panel. For 
example, in this application, any worker who never retires has a latent fixed effect of negative infinity. The problem 
does not arise in the LPM because the fixed effect is a direct effect on the probability of retiring (as in equation [3]), 
so the worker-specific fixed effect need not be infinite for a worker who never retires. 
3 In an earlier draft of this paper, we approached the estimation problem in the framework of survival or duration 
analysis. The usual way of handling heterogeneity (or “frailty”) in this literature is analogous to random effects—
see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chapters 17–19) and Wooldridge (2002, chapter 20). The fixed effects 
estimator is not well developed in the survival literature, so we take the more straightforward panel data approach 
outlined in the text, which is similar to that taken by Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic (2008) in estimating the effect of 
retirement on health outcomes. 
4 For the empirical analysis, we started with the RAND HRS Data file, Version F, which is a simplified longitudinal 
data set based on the HRS data. See St. Clair et al. (2006).  
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unemployment, partial retirement, became disabled, or left the labor force (the “other” category 
in Figure 1).5 Of the 2,313 employed full-time men still in the sample in 1994, 181 men left the 
sample through attrition by 1996, so 2,132 men remained “at risk” of retirement. Of these, 226 
(11 percent) had retired by 1996, and 235 had moved to the “other” category. The remainder of 
the figure follows in the same way between each two-year time period. Ultimately, of the 3,150 
men, 1,060 had retired by 2004, 766 were lost to the study due to attrition, 925 had moved to the 
“other” category, and 399 continued full-time employment during the entire 12 years. Note that 
we treat retirement as an absorbing state—once a worker retires, he is lost to further full-time 
work and another “retirement event.” As Ruhm (1990b, 1995) and Maestas (2004) have shown, 
this is not entirely realistic, but it is a simplification that makes sense if the model describing the 
original decision to retire differs from that describing subsequent retirement decisions. 
The HRS survey allows us to specify equation (3) using a rich set of explanatory 
variables, displayed in Table 1 and described next. The first column of Table 1 shows sample 
percentages for each variable, calculated from the 9,657 two-year transitions observed in the 
HRS sample of 3,150 men who were working full-time in 1992. The second column shows 
sample percentages calculated from the 1992 (wave 1) observations of these 3,150 men. The 
third column shows sample percentages calculated from the 1992 observations of the 1,060 men 
who retired during the subsequent six transitions we analyze. 
We model RHB coverage for worker i in year t (rhbit) using a set of mutually exclusive 
dummy variables for the following four states: 
                                                
5 Out of the labor force and retired are separate categories in the HRS, although a case could be made for counting 
men who were out of the labor force as retired. See Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) for a helpful discussion of this 
point. 
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• the worker had EPHI but no offer of RHBs6 (the reference category) 
• the worker had EPHI and would receive health benefits if he retired 
• the worker had no EPHI but was covered by some other type of health insurance  
• the worker had no health insurance coverage  
Fronstin (2005) found that roughly 57 percent of men ages 45–64 reported being covered by 
RHBs in the 1997 SIPP. As shown in Table 1, the percentage of workers covered by RHBs in the 
sample we analyze (52 percent) is somewhat lower. 
The model includes two sets of indicators modeling the type and amount of pension 
wealth held by worker i in year t (pensionit). The first models the asset value of any defined 
benefit (DB) pension the worker expected to receive. Specifically, the HRS collected employer 
contact information in 1992 and 1998, then obtained information on DB pension plans directly 
from employers when it was possible (Health and Retirement Study 2006, pp. 3–5). From these 
data, the HRS either calculated or imputed several values of each worker’s DB pension plan for 
1992 and 1998. We use “DB value at expected retirement age prorated and discounted” to 1992 
or 1998, which approximates the present discounted value of expected future plan benefits, based 
on the worker’s work to date and his self-reported expected retirement age. The amount is 
intended to be comparable to a defined contribution (DC) pension accumulation, which is why 
we use it. 
From the DB wealth variable, we construct indicators of four levels of DB pension 
wealth:  
• not included in a DB plan, hence no DB pension wealth (the reference category)  
• positive DB pension wealth up to $100,000  
                                                
6 The 1992 and 1994 question reads, “Is the health insurance plan [that currently covers you] available to people 
who retire?” The 1996 and later waves of the HRS ask explicitly whether the respondent’s health benefit plan would 
cover him if he retired before age 65.  
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• DB pension wealth of $100,000 to $200,000  
• DB pension wealth greater than $200,000  
This set of indicators can change only once during the years we observe; that is, the indicators 
take one set of values for 1992, 1994, and 1996, then can take another for 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
Table 1 shows that just over two-fifths of the sample (42 percent) had positive DB pension 
wealth in 1992 (wave 1). 
A second set of pension wealth indicators model the current accumulation (if any) in 
defined contribution (DC) pension accounts held by the worker. DC pension accumulations were 
reported by workers in every wave, unlike information on DB pensions, so they can vary fully 
over time. For DC accumulations, we construct four indicators similar to those for DB pensions: 
not included in any DC plan (the reference category); positive DC accumulation up to $100,000; 
DC accumulation of $100,000 to $200,000; and DC accumulation more than $200,000. Table 1 
shows that, in the first year they were surveyed, about one-third of the sample had a DC plan; 
however, only 7 percent had DC accumulations greater than $100,000. 
Our specification of pension incentives for retirement is similar to that used in early 
research on the effect of pensions on retirement, which specified pensions with variables for 
pension eligibility, current pension wealth, and the change in pension wealth from postponing 
retirement by one year (see the review by Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990). Important 
papers by Lazear and Moore (1988) and Stock and Wise (1990) noted that optimal retirement 
decisions require workers to be forward-looking and to consider the “option value” of continued 
work. The reduced-form empirical work that has evolved from this approach has used the ideas 
of pension wealth accrual (Gustman and Steinmeier 2001/2002, Samwick 1998) and pension 
peak value (Coile and Gruber 2007, Friedberg and Webb 2005). 
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We have not attempted to include such forward-looking measures of pension wealth in 
the models we estimate for three reasons: Doing so is computationally quite demanding, the 
needed data are not available in the public-use version of the HRS, and our main focus is on 
RHBs.7 Accordingly, it is important to acknowledge that our use of pension wealth levels (as 
opposed to a more complicated construct) represents a potential misspecification that could bias 
our estimator and lead to overstatement of the effect of RHBs on retirement. DB pension plans in 
particular create a strong incentive for a worker to retire at the plan’s normal retirement age, and 
many DB plans also create an incentive to retire shortly after reaching the plan’s early retirement 
age—see for example Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) and Samwick (1998). (DC plans do not create 
such incentives.) To the extent these ages are correlated with eligibility for RHBs, we could 
attribute to RHBs an effect that should be attributed partly or wholly to a pension plan. 
To capture possible effects of non-pension assets on decisions to retire, we include two 
sets of conventional wealth indicators (Farnham and Sevak 2007). The first captures worker i’s 
housing wealth at each interview, defined as the net value of the primary residence. (The net 
value of any secondary residence is available only starting in 1998. Accordingly, the estimates 
leave out any consideration of the value of a secondary residence.) The second set of wealth 
indicators gives the value of worker i’s non-housing wealth at each interview, defined as the sum 
of financial wealth (stocks, checking accounts, CDs, bonds, and other financial assets) plus the 
value of real estate other than primary and secondary residences, vehicles, and businesses. Note 
that this variable includes IRAs and Keoghs, which are nominally forms of retirement wealth; 
however, because many households draw on these assets before retirement (even though they 
suffer a tax penalty), treating them as nonretirement wealth is reasonable.  
                                                
7 If we did include a forward-looking measure of pensions wealth, we would in principle want to include a similarly 
constructed measure of RHB wealth. This in turn would pose two problems: first, the HRS includes only indicators 
of RHB eligibility; second, it is more difficult to place a pecuniary value on health insurance than on pensions. 
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For both housing and non-housing wealth, we construct separate sets of dummy variables 
with categories similar to those constructed for DB and DC pension wealth: no wealth (the 
reference category), positive wealth up to $100,000, wealth between $100,000 and $200,000, and 
wealth greater than $200,000. Table 1 shows that in the first year they were interviewed, 60 
percent of the sample had positive housing wealth up to $100,000, and 55 percent had positive 
non-housing wealth up to $100,000. 
The demographic controls included in the model (demogit) are age in year t (categories 
for 50–56, 57–59, 60–64, and 65 and older), an indicator equal to 1 for nonwhites, and four 
dummies indicating years of schooling (less than high school, high school graduate only, some 
college, and college graduate or more).8 
Past research on RHBs using the HRS (for example, Rogowski and Karoly 2000) has 
captured the worker’s health status (healthit) using one or more indicators constructed from the 
worker’s body mass index (BMI, weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared) in 
year t. From the reported BMI in each year, we construct indicators for underweight (BMI < 
18.5), normal weight (18.5 ≤ BMI < 25), overweight (25 ≤ BMI < 30) and obese (BMI ≥ 30). 
Table 1 shows that three-quarters of the workers in the sample were overweight or obese by this 
measure in the first year they were interviewed. 
Also following earlier research, we construct a dummy equal to 1 for workers who report 
having two or more chronic health conditions in year t—high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, 
chronic lung disease, heart disease, stroke, or arthritis. The latter is only a rough indicator of a 
respondent’s health, in part because it does not distinguish between more and less serious 
conditions. Accordingly, we also include a dummy variable equal to 1 for respondents who 
                                                
8 Brown (2006) has found that workers tend to retire at the age they regard as “usual” for workers of their type; 
however, we have not taken advantage of the “usual retirement age” question that is asked of RHS respondents.  
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report being in fair or poor health in year t. Longstanding concerns exist about the endogeneity 
of this variable to retirement decisions—that is, workers who retire report poor health as a way 
of justifying their decision—although work by McGarry (2004), which recognizes and attempts 
to control for this “justification bias,” suggests that self-reported health status is a useful measure 
of health that does have important effects on retirement. Whereas 27 percent of the workers in 
the sample reported multiple chronic conditions in the first year they were interviewed, only 12 
percent reported being in fair or poor health (Table 1).  
Because the labor force status of a spouse is likely to be important to an individual’s 
decision to retire, we include a set of mutually exclusive dummies capturing the marital status of 
each man and the employment status of his wife in year t:  
• not married (the reference category) 
• married to a woman working full-time 
• married to a woman working part-time 
• married to a woman who did not work (unemployed, retired, disabled, or not in the labor 
force) 
Couples’ labor supply decisions are likely to be made jointly, and the above set of indicators may 
be endogenous, although few papers on health insurance and labor supply have addressed the 
issue (but see Blau and Gilleskie 2006, Kapur and Rogowski 2007, and Congdon-Hohman 
2008). We have checked the sensitivity of the main estimates to inclusion or exclusion of these 
variables and find that the results are essentially unchanged. 
Finally, we include indicators of two aspects of each worker’s job in year t: whether he is 
in a blue-collar occupation and whether he is self-employed. Blue-collar work tends to be 
physically taxing, and we expect it to be related to earlier retirement. Self-employed workers 
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tend to have a taste for work, and we expect them to be less likely than others to retire. We also 
include an indicator of whether a worker has been in his job more than 15 years. This is likely to 
be correlated with eligibility for an RHB offer because RHBs are generally available only to 
workers with substantial job tenure (Fronstin 2010). 
Comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 shows how those who retired from the HRS 
sample differed from the full HRS sample. Retirees were more likely to have an RHB offer, 
positive pension balances, and job tenure exceeding 15 years at wave 1. 
 
V. Empirical Findings from the Restricted Model 
Table 2 displays estimates of equation (4) in which the effect of RHBs on retirement is 
restricted to be the same for all workers in the HRS sample described above—that is, xitβ is 
specified as in equation (2). We apply three estimators to the equation—pooled OLS, random 
effects, and fixed effects. The parameter of main interest is the coefficient on EPHI with RHB 
coverage (“employer-provided and RHB”). The pooled OLS and random effects estimates (0.03, 
p-values  = 0.00) suggest that workers with an RHB offer were 3 percentage points more likely 
to retire over a two-year interval than otherwise similar workers who had EPHI but no RHB offer 
(the reference group). The mean two-year retirement probability for these workers was 11.0 
percent, so the estimated increase in retirement probability (3 percentage points) implies that 
RHB offers increased the probability of retiring by about 27 percent. This is similar to the 
estimates obtained by Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001), who used 
early waves of the HRS. 
The pooled OLS and random effects estimators do not attempt to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity; rather, they assume that the composite error term (ci + uit) in equation (4) is 
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uncorrelated with the observable characteristics xit included in the model. The fixed effects 
estimator relaxes this assumption and suggests that an RHB offer increases the probability of 
retirement over a two-year period by 1.5 percentage points (or about 14 percent relative to the 
average retirement probability of 11 percent). This point estimate is economically substantial, but 
it is imprecise and statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.13). The fixed 
effects point estimate is roughly half that estimated by pooled OLS and random effects. 
A Hausman test of whether the random effects and fixed effects estimates are equal (not 
reported) strongly rejects equality. One interpretation of this finding is that the individual 
unobserved effects are correlated with an explanatory variable such as RHB offers. As a further 
check for unobserved heterogeneity, we calculate the simple correlation between the estimated 
fixed effects and RHB offers. (This correlation is the source of the unobserved heterogeneity 
motivating the fixed effects estimator.) The correlation coefficient is 0.177 (standard error 
0.018), suggesting that men with higher probabilities of retiring tend to have sorted into jobs 
with RHB offers. The random effects estimator suppresses this correlation and attributes too 
much influence to RHB offers as a determinant of retirement. Accordingly, one interpretation of 
the difference between the random effects estimate of the RHB effect (3 percentage points) and 
the fixed effects estimate (1.5 percentage points) is that the random effects estimator suffers from 
heterogeneity bias, and that half of the RHB effect estimated by random effects is due to 
unobserved heterogeneity rather than an RHB offer per se. 
We now discuss two alternative explanations for the difference between the random 
effects and fixed effects estimates—measurement error and functional form misspecification. In 
moving to the fixed effects estimator, any measurement error in the key RHB variable is 
amplified. For example, Freeman (1984) showed clearly that, in the presence of modest errors in 
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the measurement of union-status changes, the fixed effects estimator could lead to substantial 
downward bias in estimating the union wage effect. This occurs because, with the fixed effects 
estimator, changes in union status are the source of variation that allows estimation of the union 
wage effect, and these changes are relatively rare, so modest error in measuring union-status 
change leads to large attenuation bias. It follows that the reduction in the estimated RHB effect 
when we move to the fixed effects estimator could merely be a case of Hausman’s (2001) “Iron 
Law of Econometrics”— measurement error leads to smaller-than-expected estimates. We 
examine this issue in some detail in the Appendix and conclude that measurement error is not 
likely to be the primary cause of the attenuation observed in moving to fixed effects. 
A second alternative explanation for the difference between the random effects and fixed 
effects estimates is functional form misspecification. For example, either estimator would be 
biased if it restricted the effect of RHBs to be equal across demographic groups when the effects 
in fact differed among those groups. We examine this issue next. 
 
VI. Subgroup Effects 
Our main concern is that RHBs may have different effects on different subgroups of 
workers and at different points in the business cycle. In particular, knowing whether and how the 
retirement effect of RHBs varies by age would offer insight into the costs of RHBs and how 
changes in the age of eligibility for Medicare or other government-provided health insurance 
would affect retirement. It is also important to know whether workers are more likely to take 
advantage of RHBs when the labor market is tight or slack (Coile and Levine 2007). To address 
these questions, we replace the restrictive specification of xitβ  represented by equation (2) with 
the fully interacted specification represented by equation (3). 
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Table 3 displays selected subgroup effects estimated by pooled OLS, random effects, and 
fixed effects applied to equation (4). Figures in the “Estimate” column give the estimated effect 
of an RHB offer on the retirement probability of the specified group, relative to workers in the 
same group who had EPHI but no RHBs.9 
To begin, we note that statistical tests10 of whether the estimated RHB effects are equal 
within various subgroups reject equality in three cases: RHB effects by age subgroup, by job 
tenure, and across the two-year transitions. (To avoid clutter, we do not attempt to display these 
test results in Table 3.) Accordingly, we reject the restricted model in favor of the unrestricted 
model. 
The most striking finding in Table 3 pertains to the effect of RHBs at different ages. The 
pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects estimates all suggest that the effect of RHBs on 
retirement behavior is substantially larger at ages 60–64 than at younger ages. Indeed, the effect 
on younger workers is modest or nonexistent. For men aged 50–56, RHBs have no statistically 
significant effect on retirement decisions. For men aged 57–59, the pooled OLS and random 
effects estimates suggest that RHBs increase the two-year retirement probability by about 20 
percent (about 2.5 percentage points on a base of 11.7 percent), although the fixed effects 
estimates suggest no effect for these workers. But for men aged 60–64, the pooled OLS and 
random effects estimates suggest that RHBs more than double the probability of retirement (by 
7.5 percentage points on a base on 6.1 percent), and the fixed effects estimates suggest that 
RHBs increase the retirement probability by more than 75 percent (4.7 percentage point on a 
base of 6.1 percent). Accordingly, RHBs affected the retirement decisions mainly of men who 
                                                
9 Section III describes computation of the subgroup effects. We do not report estimated subgroup effects for pension 
wealth, housing wealth, and non-housing wealth subgroups. None of these estimated subgroup effects are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
10 These are F tests in the case of the pooled OLS estimator and Chi-squared tests in the cases of random effects and 
fixed effects. 
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were within five years of Medicare eligibility. This suggests in turn that, when employer-
provided RHBs affected retirement behavior, they provided a bridge to Medicare of at most five 
years. We illustrate the importance of these differential age effects using simulations in section 
VII.11 
Second, the pooled OLS and random effects estimates suggest that RHBs have a 
substantially stronger effect on workers with long job tenure (more than 15 years) than those 
with short job tenure (15 or fewer years). It is difficult to know how much to make of this 
finding, both because relatively few workers with 15 or fewer years of job tenure are eligible for 
RHBs, and because the fixed effects estimates fail to confirm it. 
Third, the estimates in Table 3 are consistent in suggesting that RHBs had a substantially 
greater effect on retirement during the 2000–2002 transition than during other periods. Because 
2000–2002 was a period of slack labor markets, the finding suggests that RHB offers create an 
added inducement to retire during a downturn. This makes sense in light of Coile and Levine’s 
(2007) evidence that retirements tend to increase during economic downturns for workers who 
are eligible for Social Security.12 
Finally, it is worth remarking that the overall differences between the pooled OLS and 
random effects estimates (on one hand) and the fixed effects estimates (on the other) are less 
striking in the fully interacted model (Table 3) than in the restricted model (Table 2). In 
                                                
11 Counter to any logic, all three sets of estimates suggest that RHBs decreased the retirement probability of men 
aged 65 and older in the HRS, although this effect is estimated with only about 4 percent of the worker-transitions in 
the sample. Two observations are relevant here. First, an RHB offer to a worker aged 65 or older is far less valuable 
than an RHB offer to a younger worker because virtually all retirees are eligible for Medicare at age 65. 
Accordingly, at age 65, the RHB offer becomes an offer of supplemental health insurance only, and the “treatment” 
whose effect we are estimating changes. Second, men who are still working at age 65 or older could be a select 
group who have a taste for work, although this possibility clearly undermines our argument that the fixed effects 
estimator succeeds in controlling for determinants of retirement behavior that are correlated with RHB offers. 
12 The evidence is inconsistent regarding the estimated effect of RHBs during the 1992–1994 transition, which was a 
period of labor-market expansion. The pooled OLS estimate suggests a slight positive effect during 1992–1994, the 
random effects estimate (which is a weighted average of the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates) suggests no 
effect, and the fixed-effect estimate suggests a negative effect, which would be consistent with the notion that RHBs 
are a deterrent to retirement during an expansion. We read the evidence on this point as too weak to be conclusive. 
 22 
particular, the estimated RHB effect in the restricted model is 0.03 for pooled OLS and random 
effects, but only half that (and very imprecise) for fixed effects. But in the fully interacted model, 
the three sets of estimates are consistent in suggesting that the estimated RHB effect is 
concentrated on men aged 60–64, and much weaker for younger men. We read this as tending to 
confirm our conjecture that the restricted model (Table 2) is misspecified, and that functional 
form misspecification may be an important reason for the differences between Table 2’s pooled 
OLS/random effects estimates and the corresponding fixed effects estimates. The next section 
will give further evidence tending to support this interpretation. 
 
VII. Implications for Retirement Patterns 
A complete interpretation of the estimates described above requires us to check the 
implications of those estimates for retirement patterns. To do this, we simulate survivor functions 
based on each of the six sets of estimates. These survivor functions offer important insights into 
how RHBs influence retirement. 
Table 4 shows simulated survivor functions based on the six sets of estimates in Tables 2 
and 3. Each simulation starts with 1,000 full-time workers at age 50 with the following 
characteristics: DB pension wealth, DC pension accumulation, housing wealth, and non-housing 
wealth all between $1 and $100,000; white; a high-school education; BMI between 25 and 30 
(overweight); fewer than two chronic health conditions; good or better self-reported health; 
married to a spouse who works full time; more than 15 years of job tenure; not self-employed; 
and not blue collar. For a given set of estimates, we calculate the conditional probability (or 
hazard) of retirement at each age. We then apply the retirement hazard for age t to the workers 
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still working full time at that age (the risk set). The resulting survivor function shows the number 
of men who remain working full time at each age. 
For each set of estimates, we simulate two survivor functions—one for 1,000 workers 
who do not have RHB offers, and a second for 1,000 men who do. The “RHB-No” columns 
show the number of full-time workers without RHBs at each age t (denoted N0t), and the “RHB-
Yes” column shows the number of full-time workers with RHBs at each age (N1t). To obtain the 
number of RHB-induced retirements at age t (Rt), we take the number of retirements of RHB-
offered workers at age t and subtract the number of retirements of not-RHB-offered workers at 
the same age (the counterfactual): 
Rt = (N1,t+1 – N1t) – (N0,t+1 – N0t). 13 
For example, for the Table 2 pooled OLS estimates (Table 4, panel 1), we calculate the number 
of RHB-induced retirements at age 50 as R50 = (1,000 – 977) – (1,000 – 992) = 23 – 8 = 15. [The 
survivor figures (Nkt) in Table 4 are rounded, so the Rt figures calculated from them occasionally 
differ from the Rt figures reported in the table. Note that the number of RHB-induced retirements 
becomes negative at age 60 in panels 1 and 2. This happens because by age 60 the risk set for the 
RHB-Yes group becomes small enough that it generates fewer retirements than does the RHB-
No group, even though the RHB-Yes group has the higher retirement hazard.] 
The cumulative person-years of retirement experienced by the 1,000 workers in each 
cohort at the time they reach age 65 can be calculated as 
  
€ 
(N kt − N k , t +1t=50
64
∑ )(65− t ). We report 
these figures at the bottom of each “RHB-No” and “RHB-Yes” column. For each simulation, the 
difference between the cumulative person-years of retirement for the RHB-Yes and RHB-No 
                                                
13 For the purposes of the simulation, we assume that a worker who retires at age t is still working on his tth birthday 
and retires shortly thereafter. For example, a worker who retires at age 50 will be counted as working on his 50th 
birthday, will retire shortly after that birthday, and will have 15 years of retirement when he reaches age 65. 
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∑ (65− t ) .] We report this latter figure at the bottom of each Rt column. 
Finally, for each simulation, we report person-years of RHB-induced retirements as a percentage 
of person-years of retirement for the counterfactual (RHB-ineligible) cohort. This last figure 
gauges the importance of RHBs to the overall retirement experience of the cohort. 
In performing each simulation, we set an RHB effect to zero unless the corresponding 
estimate has a p-value of 0.05 or less. As a result, the RHB-No and RHB-Yes survivor functions 
based on Table 2’s fixed effects estimates (Table 4, panel 3) are identical—RHBs have no 
estimated effect with this model and estimator. The same is true until age 57 for the survivor 
functions based on the Table 3 pooled OLS and random effects estimates (panels 4 and 5) and 
until age 60 for those based on the Table 3 fixed effects estimates (panel 6). 
The survivor functions based on Table 2’s pooled OLS and random effects estimates 
(Table 4, panels 1 and 2) suggest that RHBs induce 1,325 and 1,142 person-years of retirement 
by age 65 in a cohort of 1,000 workers— representing increases in cumulative person-years of 
retirement of 57 percent and 37 percent. In contrast, the survivor functions based on Table 2’s 
fixed effects estimates (panel 3) suggest that RHBs induce no retirement. We show these 
simulations as benchmarks, although all three restrict the effect of RHBs to be equal at all ages—
a restriction we have rejected—and those based on pooled OLS and random effects may be 
marred by heterogeneity bias. 
The survivor functions based on Table 3’s estimates, which allow the effect of RHBs to 
vary with age, tell quite a different story. Consider first the simulations based on the pooled OLS 
and random effects estimates (Table 4, panels 4 and 5). These suggest that RHBs induce 530 and 
455 person-years of retirement by age 65—increases in cumulative retirement of 19 percent and 
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11 percent. This RHB-induced increase in retirement is about one-third of the increase seen 
when we assume the effect of RHBs is constant at all ages (panels 1 and 2). The reason for these 
differences is clear: RHBs have no effect on retirement until age 57 in panels 4 and 5. 
The survivor functions based on Table 3’s fixed effects estimates (Table 4, panel 6) 
suggest that RHBs induce 215 person-years of retirement—a 6.4 percent increase in cumulative 
retirement, or 30 to 60 percent of the effect on cumulative retirement shown in panels 4 and 5. 
This occurs both because RHBs have no effect on retirement until age 60 in panel 6, and because 
the estimated RHB effect on retirement of workers aged 60–64 is smaller in panel 6 than in 
panels 4 and 5. 
An important implication of the simulations is that they make it less important for us to 
take a stand on which estimator—pooled OLS, random effects, or fixed effects—is most 
convincing. Why? The differences among the simulations in panels 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4, which 
result from different estimators, are striking. But Table 4 makes clear that functional form 
specification—in particular, allowing the effect of RHBs on retirement to vary with age—is 
more important than the choice of an estimator. If we base our inference on the restricted model, 
then estimates of the effect of RHBs on cumulative retirement range between 0 and 57 percent 
(Table 4, panels 1, 2, and 3)—a range too wide to be useful. Rejecting the restricted model and 
allowing the effect of RHBs to vary with age narrows the range to between 6 and 19 percent 
(panels 4, 5, and 6). If we then reject pooled OLS because the random effects estimator 
dominates (by accounting for serial correlation of the composite error term), we further narrow 
the range to between 6 and 11 percent (panels 5 and 6). Finally, we might favor the upper end of 
this range if we believe measurement error attenuates the fixed effects estimate, but in any case, 
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the conclusion would be that RHBs have a significant but relatively modest effect of the 
cumulative retirement of workers aged 50 to 65. 
 
VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
We have used data from the main cohort of the Health and Retirement Study to extend 
past work on RHBs in two ways. First, we specify an unrestricted model that allows the effect of 
RHBs to differ among different subgroups of workers—in particular, among workers of different 
ages—and over time. The findings suggest that RHBs had no effect on the retirement behavior of 
working men aged 50–56, a modest or no effect on the retirement behavior of men aged 57–59, 
and increased the retirement probability of men aged 60–64 by 5 to 7.5 percentage points (on a 
base of 6.1 percent for 60–64-year-old men without RHBs). Also, workers with RHBs were 
substantially more likely to retire during the slack labor market of 2000–2002. To the extent 
RHBs have an effect on retirement behavior, then, the effects appear to be for men in their early 
60s (that is, workers who are within five years of Medicare eligibility), and during periods of 
slack labor markets. 
Second, because we examine a sample of men from the HRS over a 12-year period, we 
can apply a fixed effects estimator as a possible way of controlling for unobserved individual 
effects on retirement. Unobserved effects are a concern because it stands to reason that workers 
with a taste for early retirement would select (or sort into) jobs that offer RHBs; accordingly, 
estimators that do not take account of unobserved tastes for retirement will tend to overstate the 
retirement effect of RHB offers per se. On their face, estimates of the restricted model do suggest 
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity: Whereas pooled OLS and random effects estimators 
suggest that RHB offers increase the two-year retirement probability of men aged 60–64 by 0.03 
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(that is, by 27 percent relative to the average two-year retirement probability of 0.11), the fixed 
effects estimator suggests that RHB offers increase the retirement probability of these men by 
0.015 percentage points (14 percent), and this latter estimate is quite imprecise (p-value = 0.13). 
Nevertheless, unobserved heterogeneity is only one possible explanation for the smaller 
estimated RHB effect when we move from a pooled OLS or random effects estimator to a fixed 
effects estimator—measurement error in the RHB variable and functional form misspecification 
are alternative possibilities. In the appendix, we perform two sets of tests to check whether the 
attenuated fixed effects estimates result from measurement error in the RHB variable. We first 
restrict the sample to observations in which we are relatively confident that the RHB questions 
were answered accurately, and find that the estimated RHB effects are similar to those estimated 
with the full sample. This suggests that measurement error explains little or none of the 
attenuation in the fixed effects estimates. We then apply a bounding technique, which offers 
somewhat more support for measurement error as an explanation for the attenuation. Still, the 
bounding technique suggests that half or more of the attenuation cannot be explained by 
measurement error. Although these tests for the severity of measurement error are far from 
conclusive, we believe it is safe to say that measurement error plays a relatively minor role in the 
attenuation that occurs when we employ fixed effects, and that half or more of the attenuation 
results from model misspecification (an overly restrictive functional form, for example) or from 
controlling for time-invariant unobservables that are specific to the individual worker. 
The empirical survivor functions reported in section VII clarify the implications of the 
findings and highlight the importance of allowing the effect of RHBs on retirement to vary by 
age. Survivor functions based on the restricted model, which forces the effect of RHBs to be 
equal for all workers aged 50-65, give results that are too dispersed to be useful. Specifically, 
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these survivor functions suggest that RHBs could have no effect at all on cumulative person-
years of retirement at all (if we base the survivor functions on Table 2’s fixed effects estimates), 
or RHBs could increase cumulative person-years of retirement increase by 37 to 57 percent (if 
we base them on random effects or pooled OLS). 
In sharp contrast, when we base the survivor functions on the unrestricted model in which 
the effect of RHBs varies with age, we find that RHBs increase cumulative person-years of 
retirement by 6 to 11 percent. This relatively modest effect (and narrow range) results because, 
in the unrestricted model, RHBs consistently affect the retirement behavior only of men in their 
early 60s. 
RHBs and policies that would expand the availability of government-provided health care 
to workers under age 65 have been a concern to both employers and policymakers. Employers’ 
concerns have focused on the effects of RHBs on labor costs, and policymakers have focused on 
the costs and possible labor market effects of expanding Medicare. The findings presented here 
suggest the importance of distinguishing the effects of these plans and policies on workers of 
different ages. Although RHBs appear to have a significant effect on the retirement behavior of 
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
(percentages except where noted) 
 












Number of men 3,150 3,150 1,060 
Number of two-year transitions 9,657 n/a n/a 
Health Insurance Coverage    
 employer-provided but no RHBs (reference) 30.8 24.2 21.6 
 employer-provided and RHBs 51.6 56.1 67.6 
 non-employer  8.3 7.8 4.7 
 none 9.4 11.9 6.0 
Defined Benefit pension wealth ($)    
 0 (reference) 58.8 57.6 43.7 
 1–100,000  23.0 23.9 28.7 
 100,001–200,000 8.9 9.2 13.5 
 > 200,000 9.3 9.2 14.2 
Defined Contribution pension accumulation ($)    
 0 (reference) 64.7 64.7 56.9 
 1–100,000  28.0 29.7 35.9 
 100,001–200,000  3.5 3.2 4.9 
 > 200,000  3.8 2.4 2.3 
Housing wealth ($)    
 <1 (reference) 15.8 18.3 11.9 
 1–100,000  59.5 62.2 68.7 
 100,001–200,000  18.0 14.9 15.7 
 > 200,000  6.7 4.6 3.7 
Non-housing wealth ($)    
 <1 (reference) 5.1 5.8 3.7 
 1–100,000  54.9 61.6 64.3 
 100,001–200,000  14.9 13.4 15.4 
 > 200,000  25.1 19.2 16.7 
Age    
 50–56 (reference) 39.0 63.6 54.0 
 57–59  28.0 24.0 29.8 
 60–64  29.0 12.4 16.2 
 65 or older  4.0 0.0 0.0 
Nonwhite  14.6 16.2 13.9 
Education    
 less than high school (reference) 22.5 24.4 25.2 
 high school only  32.5 32.7 36.6 












 some college  19.5 19.2 16.7 
 college degree or more  25.6 23.6 21.5 
Body Mass Index    
 underweight (BMI<18.5) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 normal (18.5≤ BMI < 25) (reference) 27.1 29.6 26/6 
 overweight (25≤ BMI < 30)  49.6 49.5 50.8 
 obese (BMI ≥ 30) 23.1 20.7 22.5 
Multiple chronic health conditions  26.8 20.1 22.8 
Fair or poor self-reported health  12.2 11.9 12.2 
Marital status and spouse’s employment    
 not married (reference) 15.2 15.9 14.8 
 married/spouse full-time  37.1 37.9 38.2 
 married/spouse part-time  14.2 14.9 14.5 
 married/spouse < part-time  33.5 31.2 32.5 
Job tenure > 15 years 50.0 49.1 60.8 
Self-employed  20.1 19.6 9.3 
Blue-collar occupation 43.1 44.4 47.6 
Transitions    
 1992–1994 (reference) 32.6 100.00 100.0 
 1994–1996  24.0 0.00 0.0 
 1996–1998  17.3 0.00 0.0 
 1998–2000  12.4 0.00 0.0 
 2000–2002  8.5 0.00 0.0 
 2002–2004  5.3 0.00 0.0 
 



























Health insurance coverage          
 employer-provided but no RHB (reference)         
 employer-provided and RHB 0.030 0.007 0.000 0.029 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.010 0.132 
 non-employer  0.021 0.012 0.080 0.025 0.013 0.055 0.030 0.016 0.057 
 none 0.000 0.010 0.998 0.004 0.011 0.686 0.020 0.015 0.196 
DB pension wealth ($)          
 0 (reference)          
 1–100,000 0.023 0.008 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.037 -0.017 0.018 0.340 
 100,001–200,000 0.082 0.014 0.000 0.087 0.016 0.000 0.040 0.027 0.149 
 > 200,000 0.093 0.015 0.000 0.109 0.017 0.000 0.088 0.032 0.005 
DC pension accumulation ($)          
 0 (reference)          
 1–100,000 -0.019 0.007 0.008 -0.027 0.008 0.000 -0.042 0.009 0.000 
 100,001–200,000 0.004 0.018 0.836 -0.010 0.020 0.596 -0.031 0.023 0.190 
 > 200,000 -0.001 0.018 0.950 -0.010 0.020 0.619 -0.015 0.025 0.565 
Housing wealth ($)          
 <1 (reference)          
 1–100,000 0.004 0.008 0.637 -0.005 0.009 0.596 -0.052 0.013 0.000 
 100,001–200,000 0.005 0.011 0.658 -0.001 0.012 0.921 -0.034 0.018 0.057 
 > 200,000 0.001 0.015 0.960 -0.003 0.017 0.869 -0.023 0.025 0.359 
Non-housing wealth ($)          
 <1 (reference)          
 1–100,000 0.029 0.011 0.012 0.031 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.361 
 100,001–200,000 0.059 0.014 0.000 0.061 0.016 0.000 0.030 0.020 0.143 





















Age          
 50-56 (reference)          
 57–59 0.038 0.007 0.000 0.029 0.007 0.000 -0.024 0.011 0.026 
 60–64 0.173 0.010 0.000 0.181 0.011 0.000 0.119 0.019 0.000 
 65 or older 0.135 0.022 0.000 0.194 0.025 0.000 0.142 0.036 0.000 
Non-white -0.012 0.009 0.195 -0.012 0.011 0.258  dropped  
Education          
 less than high school (reference)          
 high school only -0.009 0.009 0.303 -0.009 0.011 0.404  dropped  
 some college -0.030 0.010 0.003 -0.034 0.012 0.004  dropped  
 college degree or more -0.046 0.010 0.000 -0.054 0.013 0.000  dropped  
Body Mass Index          
 underweight 0.121 0.092 0.191 0.121 0.091 0.185 0.102 0.112 0.363 
 normal (reference)          
 overweight 0.008 0.007 0.267 0.004 0.008 0.601 -0.006 0.014 0.643 
 obese 0.016 0.009 0.074 0.015 0.010 0.135 -0.007 0.021 0.727 
Multiple chronic health conditions 0.016 0.008 0.035 0.021 0.009 0.024 0.010 0.017 0.554 
Fair or poor self-reported health 0.038 0.011 0.001 0.040 0.012 0.001 0.034 0.016 0.029 
Martial status and spouse’s employment          
 not married (reference)          
 married/spouse full-time -0.034 0.010 0.000 -0.042 0.011 0.000 -0.030 0.023 0.187 
 married/spouse part-time -0.048 0.011 0.000 -0.054 0.013 0.000 -0.033 0.024 0.171 
 married/spouse < part-time -0.010 0.010 0.325 -0.014 0.012 0.233 -0.002 0.023 0.921 
Job tenure > 15 years 0.035 0.007 0.000 0.040 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.341 
Self-employed -0.067 0.009 0.000 -0.075 0.010 0.000 -0.020 0.017 0.233 
Blue-collar occupation 0.015 0.007 0.035 0.011 0.008 0.168 -0.024 0.016 0.144 
          





















Transitions          
 1992-1994 (reference)          
 1994–1996  0.003 0.007 0.638 0.020 0.007 0.004 0.077 0.007 0.000 
 1996–1998  -0.004 0.009 0.678 0.025 0.009 0.003 0.116 0.010 0.000 
 1998–2000  -0.004 0.012 0.718 0.033 0.012 0.005 0.154 0.016 0.000 
 2000–2002  0.021 0.016 0.180 0.064 0.016 0.000 0.204 0.021 0.000 
 2002–2004  -0.017 0.021 0.399 0.031 0.022 0.155 0.184 0.030 0.000 
Constant -0.016 0.016 0.323 0.000 0.019 0.982 0.018 0.031 0.553 
Number of observations 9,657   9,657   9,657   
Number of men 3,150   3,150   3,150   
R2 (within) n/a   0.161   0.179   
R2 (between) n/a   0.065   0.002   
R2 (overall) 0.105   0.101   0.051   
ρ n/a   0.269   0.545   
 
Note: Figures in the “Coef. estimate” column give estimated average effects on the two-year retirement probability of men in the full sample, 
as described in Table 1 and Figure 1. Estimates come from applying pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects estimators to equation 
(4), with xitβ  specified as in equation (2). The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a man was retired in period t+1 (approximately 
two years after t). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of errors for each worker over time. The non-white 
and education variables are dropped from the fixed effects estimator because they do not vary over time. 
 
Table 3 
Estimated RHB Effects for Subgroups from the Full Sample 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Subgroup or transition Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Age 50–56 0.008  (0.40) 0.000 (0.98) -0.022 (0.09) 
Age 57–59 0.027  (0.02) 0.024 (0.04) -0.011 (0.47) 
Age 60–64 0.075  (0.02) 0.080 (0.00) 0.047 (0.02) 
Age 65+ -0.120  (0.01) -0.144 (0.00) -0.191 (0.00) 
White   0.030  (0.00) 0.026 (0.00) -0.007 (0.55) 
Non-white 0.012  (0.47) 0.013 (0.46) 0.004 (0.86) 
Less than high school 0.046  (0.00) 0.038 (0.03) -0.012 (0.62) 
High school only 0.029  (0.01) 0.024 (0.06) -0.013 (0.46) 
Some college 0.035  (0.01) 0.032 (0.02) 0.018 (0.32) 
College degree or more 0.005  (0.73) 0.007 (0.62) -0.007 (0.72) 
Fair or poor self-reported health 0.045  (0.03) 0.042 (0.06) -0.006 (0.82) 
Good/very good/excellent self-reported health 0.025  (0.00) 0.022 (0.01) -0.005 (0.63) 
Multiple chronic health conditions 0.016  (0.24) 0.012 (0.41) -0.013 (0.51) 
Without multiple chronic health conditions 0.032  (0.00) 0.029 (0.00) -0.002 (0.82) 
Not married 0.048  (0.01) 0.045 (0.02) 0.006 (0.80) 
Married / spouse works full-time 0.015  (0.13) 0.014 (0.19) -0.006 (0.66) 
Married / spouse works part-time 0.024  (0.12) 0.017 (0.30) -0.004 (0.82) 
Married / spouse works < part-time 0.034  (0.00) 0.030 (0.02) -0.010 (0.54) 
Job tenure at most 15 years 0.009  (0.35) 0.007 (0.46) -0.015 (0.27) 
Job tenure > 15 years 0.047  (0.00) 0.041 (0.00) 0.004 (0.78) 
Blue-collar occupation 0.029  (0.01) 0.024 (0.05) -0.011 (0.50) 
White-collar occupation 0.027  (0.00) 0.025 (0.01) -0.001 (0.94) 
1992–1994 transition 0.022  (0.05) 0.013 (0.28) -0.054 (0.00) 
1994–1996 transition 0.019  (0.14) 0.013 (0.32) -0.023 (0.15) 
1996–1998 transition 0.028  (0.07) 0.029 (0.62) 0.024 (0.13) 
1998–2000 transition 0.014  (0.47) 0.014 (0.47) 0.017 (0.39) 
2000–2002 transition 0.081  (0.00) 0.088 (0.00) 0.095 (0.00) 
2002–2004 transition 0.041  (0.29) 0.056 (0.16) 0.068 (0.10) 
Estimated main RHB effect (from Table 2): 0.030 (0.00) 0.029 (0.00) 0.015 (0.13) 
 
Note: Figures in the “Estimate” column give the estimated effect of an RHB offer on the two-year retirement 
probability of workers in the specified group, relative to workers in the same group who had employer-provided 
health insurance but no RHB. Subgroup estimates are obtained by estimating equation (4) with xitβ  specified as in 
equation (3)—that is, rhb is fully interacted with the other independent variables in the model. Each subgroup 
estimate is computed by evaluating the derivative of retired with respect to rhb for the subgroup at the sample 
mean. Section III describes computation of the subgroup effects from the complete model. Complete model 
estimates are available from the authors. 
 
Table 4 




















  RHB   RHB   RHB   RHB   RHB   RHB  
  No Yes Rt  No Yes Rt  No Yes Rt  No Yes Rt  No Yes Rt  No Yes Rt 
50 1000 1000 15  1000 1000 15  1000 1000 0  1000 1000 0  1000 1000 0  1000 1000 0 
51 992 977 15  978 964 14  973 973 0  984 984 0  969 969 0  970 970 0 
52 983 954 14  956 928 13  947 947 0  968 968 0  938 938 0  940 940 0 
53 975 931 14  935 894 12  921 921 0  953 953 0  909 909 0  911 911 0 
54 966 909 13  915 862 11  896 896 0  937 937 0  881 881 0  884 884 0 
55 958 888 13  895 830 11  872 872 0  922 922 0  853 853 0  857 857 0 
56 950 867 12  875 800 10  849 849 0  907 907 0  826 826 0  831 831 0 
57 942 847 10  856 771 8  826 826 0  893 893 12  800 800 10  805 805 0 
58 916 811 9  825 732 7  813 813 0  866 854 11  769 759 9  793 793 0 
59 891 776 8  794 694 6  801 801 0  840 816 10  738 720 8  780 780 0 
60 866 743 -1  765 659 -2  789 789 0  815 781 26  709 683 26  768 768 18 
61 784 661 -2  679 575 -3  721 721 0  745 685 21  637 585 19  712 694 15 
62 710 589 -3  603 502 -4  658 658 0  682 601 16  573 502 14  660 627 12 
63 642 524 -3  535 438 -5  601 601 0  624 527 12  515 430 9  612 566 10 
64 581 466 -4  475 383 -5  549 549 0  571 463 8  463 369 6  567 512 8 
65 526 415 --  421 334 --  502 502 --  522 406 --  416 316 --  525 462 -- 
                        Cumulative person-years of retirement:                     
 2313 3642 1325  3491 4634 1142  3281 3281 0  2772 3303 530  4004 4458 455  3385 3600 215 
Person-years of RHB-induced retirements as a percentage of person-years of retirement for the counterfactual (RHB-ineligible) cohort: 
    57     37     0     19     11    6.4    
 
Note: The “RHB-No” and “RHB-Yes” columns show the number of workers without and with RHB offers who remain working full-time based on retirement 
hazard functions (conditional probabilities of retiring at each age) calculated from each of the six sets of estimates in Tables 2 and 3 and applied to a cohort of 
1,000 workers starting at age 50. The Rt column shows the number of RHB-induced retirements at each age. “Cumulative person-years of retirement” are the 
accumulated number of years of retirement experienced by each cohort at the time it reaches age 65. See the text for further discussion. 
Figure 1
HRS analysis sample transitions illustrated
3,150 employed full-time (EFT) men
2,313 EFT 225 retired 309 other 303 attrition 1992-1994 transition sampleN = 2,847
1,671 EFT 226 retired 235 other 181 attrition 1994-1996 transition sampleN = 2,132
1,194 EFT 185 retired 166 other 126 attrition 1996-1998 transition sampleN = 1,545
819 EFT 169 retired 123 other 83 attrition 1998-2000 transition sampleN = 1,111
510 EFT 161 retired 92 other 56 attrition 2000-2002 transition sampleN = 763
399 EFT 94 retired n/a other 17 attrition 2002-2004 transition sampleN = 510
Notes: EFT refers to employed full-time workers. “Attrition” includes those who were not 
interviewed or died. “Other” includes part-time, unemployed, disabled, and not in the labor 
force.
Source: Authors’ tabulations of Health and Retirement Study data. See text for discussion.  
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Appendix. Sensitivity of the Findings to Measurement Error 
In this appendix, we take two approaches to appraising the extent to which measurement 
error may be responsible for attenuation of the RHB effect when we move to a fixed effects 
estimator. First, we follow Hirsch and Schumacher’s (1998) sample restriction approach, which 
involves narrowing the sample to observations in which responses are likely to be accurate, then 
checking whether the findings differ from those obtained with the full sample. Second, we make 
use of econometric bounding techniques developed to appraise the seriousness of measurement 
error. 
Table A1 summarizes the findings of two sets of sample restriction tests. For comparison, 
row 1 of the table repeats the estimated RHB effects from Table 2 (pooled OLS, random effects, 
and fixed effects). Rows 2a and 2b report estimated RHB effects after dropping the first wave 
(row 2a) or the first and second waves (row 2b) of our analysis sample and re-estimating the 
models. The rationale for dropping the first two waves is developed by Congdon-Hohman 
(2008), who notes that some households’ responses to the RHB question appear inconsistent, 
especially during the first three waves of the survey. The inconsistencies appear to arise from 
two sources: first, a change in the RHB question between wave 2 and wave 3, and second, the 
possibility that the household member answering the RHB question changed between wave 1 
and wave 3. Dropping the first wave (or first and second waves) should lessen the effects of 
these inconsistencies. The findings in rows 2a and 2b suggest that all three estimators are fairly 
robust to dropping the first one or two waves from the sample. In particular, the difference 
between the pooled OLS and random effects estimates (on one hand) and the fixed effects 
estimates (on the other) are consistently about 1.5 percentage points. If we believe that 
measurement of RHB eligibility is likely to be more accurate in later waves of the HRS, then 
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these findings suggest that something other than measurement error (functional form 
misspecification or unobserved heterogeneity) is attenuating the fixed effects estimates. 
Rows 3a, 3b, and 3c of Table A1 report estimates from a second set of sample restriction 
tests. The estimates in these rows come from samples in which individuals have been dropped if 
their reported RHB status changed more than three times (row 3a), more than twice (row 3b), or 
more than once (row 3c). The rationale here is that workers typically must have several years of 
tenure with an employer before they become eligible for RHBs, so those who report multiple 
changes in their RHB eligibility are less likely to be reporting their true RHB status. For 
example, it is unlikely that a worker would lose and then regain RHB eligibility over the (at 
most) ten years (1992–2002) for which we observe RHB status. Accordingly, we expect the 
estimates in rows 3a, 3b, and 3c to be the product of progressively less measurement error. 
Rows 3a and 3b suggest that dropping workers who report two or more changes in RHB 
status has little influence on the estimates, which again suggests that factors other than 
measurement error are attenuating the fixed effects estimates. In row 3c, we restrict the sample to 
individuals who are most likely to be giving reliable reports about their RHB eligibility, and the 
fixed effects estimate of the RHB effect is nil. This last finding would suggest that measurement 
error plays essentially no role in explaining differences between the random effects and fixed 
effects estimates.14 
Whereas Table A1 shows estimates of the restricted model using various subsamples of 
data, Table A2 displays subgroup effects (based on the unrestricted model) estimated from a 
subsample more likely than the full sample to be reporting their true RHB status. The setup of 
this table is the same as Table 3; the only difference is that the estimates come from a sample in 
                                                
14 We have also examined cross-tabulations of changes in RHB status by job tenure and by change in job, and have 
attempted to use these joint changes to detect misclassification of RHB status. Samples selected in these ways are 
almost identical to those used for the estimates in row 3c of Table A1. 
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which workers changed RHB status at most once during the time we observe them (so the 
estimates are analogous to row 3c of Table A1). The findings displayed in Table A2 are 
essentially consistent with those in Table 3, which suggests again that most of the attenuation in 
the fixed effects estimates can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity rather than 
measurement error. 
The second approach we take to appraising the seriousness of measurement error is to 
make use of bounding techniques (see Bound, Brown, and Methiowetz 2001 for an overview). In 
particular, we take advantage of Bollinger’s (1996, 2001) method of calculating the proportion p 
of “positive misclassifications” that would be consistent with attenuation being fully attributable 
to measurement error. In our context, a “positive misclassification” is a worker who is classified 
as RHB-eligible when he is in fact RHB-ineligible. Bollinger’s formula is: 
p < Px(1 – R2)(1 – b/d), 
where Px is the mean proportion of RHB-eligibles observed in the sample; R2 is the R2 computed 
from the regression of rhb on all controls, including a dummy variable for each individual; b is 
the slope coefficient on rhb from the pooled OLS regression of retired on rhb and all controls; 
and d is the inverse of the coefficient on retired from the reverse regression (pooled OLS 
regression rhb on retirement and all controls). A similar formula gives the proportion q of 
“negative misclassifications” (classified as RHB-ineligible when in fact RHB-eligible) consistent 
with attenuation being fully attributable to measurement error. 
When we apply Bollinger’s method to this problem, we obtain a bound for p of 0.185 {= 
0.516 x (1 – 0.641) x [1 – (0.0305/15.73)]} and a bound for q of 0.173 {= (1 – 0.516) x (1 – 
0.641) x [1 – (.0305/15.73)]. The interpretation of these findings is that if approximately 17 
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percent or more of the RHB responses are errors, then we should attribute all of the attenuation 
in the fixed effects estimates to measurement error. 
The question, of course, is whether as many as 17 percent of the RHB responses in the 
HRS are in error. In the absence of a validation study of RHB responses, we cannot answer this 
question with any confidence. However, Mitchell’s (1988) validation study of the extent to 
which workers know about their pension plans suggested that about 10 percent of workers in the 
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances were misinformed about whether they were covered by a 
pension or about the type of pension (DB or DC) for which they were eligible. Whether 
measurement error is similar in the case of RHBs is an open question; however, RHBs and 
pensions are similar kinds of benefits, so 10 percent might be a reasonable first approximation to 
the extent of measurement error of RHB eligibility in the HRS. If so, and if we take the above 
calculations at face value, then about half the attenuation of the fixed effects estimates 
(compared with the pooled OLS and random effects) might be attributable to unobserved 
heterogeneity; the other half would be attributed to measurement error. 
Finally, it is worth noting that recent work by Bollinger and van Hasselt (2009) suggests 
that the bounds we have calculated may be unreasonably wide. The implication is that we should 
probably not take the above bounding calculations at face value, but should attribute less of the 
attenuation of the fixed effects estimates to measurement error than those calculations suggest. In 
this case, we would attribute more than half of the attenuation to functional form 
misspecification or controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Although it would be unwise to draw strong conclusions from these two exercises, each 
is suggestive. When we restrict the sample in various ways to workers who we believe were 
surveyed more accurately or consistently, or who gave more accurate self-reports of RHB 
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coverage, we continue to obtain fixed effects estimates that are roughly half the size of the 
pooled OLS and random effects estimates. Accordingly the sample restriction sensitivity tests 
offer evidence that measurement error is not the cause of the attenuated fixed effects estimates. 
The bounding exercise offers more support to measurement error as an explanation of the 
attenuated fixed effects estimates, but it suggests nevertheless that half or more of the attenuation 
has some other cause. Overall, we conclude that most of the attenuation occurs because the fixed 




Sensitivity Tests: Estimated Average RHB Effects from Restricted Samples 
 














 Number of  
transitions 
 Number of 
individuals 
1. Full Sample 
     (from Table 2)   0.030 0.007 0.000  0.029 0.008 0.000  0.015 0.010 0.132  9,567  3,150 
2a. Wave 1 dropped  0.031 0.009 0.001  0.028 0.010 0.003  0.018 0.011 0.099  6,507  2,313 
2b. Waves 1 and 2 
dropped  0.038 0.012 0.002  0.035 0.013 0.007  0.021 0.016 0.195  4,194  1.671 
3a.  Changed RHB 
status at most three 
times 
 0.031 0.007 0.000  0.029 0.008 0.000  0.015 0.010 0.146  9,543  3,131 
3b. Changed RHB 
status at most twice  0.032 0.008 0.000  0.030 0.008 0.000  0.013 0.011 0.233  9,032  3,042 
3c. Changed RHB 
status at most once  0.024 0.009 0.001  0.024 0.010 0.016  -0.000 0.015 0.986  7,485  2,740 
Note: Figures in the “Coef. estimate” column give estimated average effects on the two-year retirement probability of men in various restricted 
samples, as shown in the “Sample” column. The model estimated is the same as that underlying the estimates in Table 2. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of errors for each worker over time. 
 
Table A2 
Estimated RHB Effects for Subgroups from the Sample Restricted  
to Workers Who Changes RHB Status at Most Once 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Subgroup or transition Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Age 50–56 0.012  (0.35) 0.004 (0.76) -0.037 (0.07) 
Age 57–59 0.019  (0.19) 0.022 (0.15) -0.015 (0.46) 
Age 60–64 0.062  (0.00) 0.076 (0.00) 0.051 (0.06) 
Age 65+ -0.107  (0.10) -0.143 (0.04) -0.201 (0.01) 
White   0.027  (0.01) 0.028 (0.01) -0.011 (0.52) 
Non-white 0.001  (0.96) 0.001 (0.97) -0.016 (0.68) 
Less than high school 0.057  (0.00) 0.055 (0.01) -0.004 (0.91) 
High school only 0.022  (0.13) 0.017 (0.30) -0.041 (0.13) 
Some college 0.023  (0.15) 0.023 (0.19) 0.014 (0.59) 
College degree or more -0.004  (0.83) 0.006 (0.77) -0.001 (0.98) 
Fair or poor self-reported health 0.039  (0.12) 0.041 (0.13) -0.015 (0.66) 
Good/very good/excellent self-reported health 0.021  (0.03) 0.022 (0.05) -0.011 (0.49) 
Multiple chronic health conditions 0.010  (0.53) 0.009 (0.63) -0.018 (0.50) 
Without multiple chronic health conditions 0.028  (0.01) 0.030 (0.01) -0.009 (0.58) 
Not married 0.061  (0.00) 0.063 (0.01) 0.021 (0.59) 
Married / spouse works full-time 0.006  (0.62) 0.007 (0.60) -0.020 (0.34) 
Married / spouse works part-time 0.008  (0.69) 0.004 (0.84) -0.014 (0.61) 
Married / spouse works < part-time 0.032  (0.02) 0.033 (0.03) -0.016 (0.47) 
Job tenure at most 15 years 0.010  (0.40) 0.011 (0.39) -0.015 (0.42) 
Job tenure > 15 years 0.037  (0.00) 0.037 (0.01) -0.008 (0.71) 
Blue-collar occupation 0.025  (0.07) 0.025 (0.10) -0.014 (0.55) 
White-collar occupation 0.022  (0.05) 0.023 (0.07) -0.010 (0.61) 
1992–1994 transition 0.015  (0.24) 0.008 (0.55) -0.064 (0.01) 
1994–1996 transition 0.017  (0.28) 0.012 (0.44) -0.031 (0.14) 
1996–1998 transition 0.021  (0.29) 0.024 (0.22) 0.012 (0.58) 
1998–2000 transition 0.018  (0.49) 0.024 (0.39) 0.022 (0.46) 
2000–2002 transition 0.099  (0.01) 0.114 (0.01) 0.117 (0.01) 
2002–2004 transition 0.006  (0.91) 0.032 (0.55) 0.036 (0.53) 
Estimated main RHB effect (from Table A1, 
row 3c): 0.024 (0.00) 0.024 (0.02) -0.000 (0.99) 
 
Note: The above estimates come from the same model as that underlying Table 3’s estimates, but estimated using 
a sample of workers whose reported RHB eligibility changed at most once during the years observed. See the 
note to Table 3. 
 
